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Abstract 
Among non-traditional threats to security, the problem of 
refugees is an important one. Because of political turmoil 
in several parts of the world, refugee flows are going 
beyond the capacity of the international system of handle. 
In South Asia, because of the ongoing conflict between 
two major nations, India and Pakistan, the issue assumes 
a serious dimension. We can understand this by studying 
the following two case studies: the Bangladesh war and 
the Afghan war. In both cases, the number of refugees 
was massive and in both cases, America was the principal 
external actor. But while in the case of Bengali refugees, 
the host state tried to take advantage of the situation for 
promoting its foreign policy goals, in the case of Afghan 
refugees, the host nation tried to use the situation to 
promote its foreign policy as well as domestic political 
goals. Although every host state had to face unforeseen 
consequences, in the long run, it underlines the relevance 
of the discourse of the refugee-security interface.  
Keywords: Afghan War, India and Pakistan, Refugees, Security 
1. Introduction 
Apart from Afghanistan, no South Asian state, has a refugee law. In 
South Asia, therefore, the term is used rather loosely to refer to 
migrants, unauthorised settlers, and, even internally displaced 
people such as the displaced Hindus of Kashmir. The focus in this 
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paper, however, is on the cross-border variety. A rough calculation 
shows that ever since independence, about 50 million people have 
crossed the international borders in this region for permanent or 
semi-permanent settlements.  They influence the domestic as well 
as the foreign policies of both the mother and the host country with 
inherent security implications. To make sense of this connection, 
one should focus on some theoretical questions and then try to read 
the South Asian situation through two case studies, East-Pakistani 
refugees in India in the wake of the Bangladesh liberation war and 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan after the Soviet intervention of 1979. 
1.1 Refugee-Security Linkage 
National security is no longer viewed in strictly military terms.  
Non-military threats have also become equally important.  These 
threats include environmental degradation, poverty, ethnic strife, 
and pandemics. One such non-military threat concerns the 
refugees. Civil wars, insurgency, ethnic or religious persecution, 
and even natural disasters causes the refugees to seek shelter in 
another country. Refugees affect the host countries in several ways: 
pressures on resources and civic amenities, threats to internal and 
external security and even political stability. Quite often they 
jeopardise the relationship between the mother and the host 
countries. The first document that defined the refugee, that is, the 
1951 Refugee Convention had also talked of this security linkage. 
After decolonisation, as new states started coming into being 
gradually, the problem became widespread. It is not well known 
but the intra-developing country refugee movement is much higher 
than the one from developing to a developed country.  Recent 
reports suggest that they account for almost 60 percent of the global 
refugee movement; 35 percent of Asian migrants migrated within 
the continent (World Migration Report, 2013). 
The refugees sometimes indulge in armed campaigns against their 
mother country, which some scholars have termed as „refugee 
warriors‟.  This, in turn, affects the foreign policy between those 
two countries.  The best example of this is Israel, a nation of 
diasporas. Moreover, it was the refugee movement that triggered 
the reunification of Germany. The massive number of East 
Germans arriving in West Germany as refugees in July-August 
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1989 led to the collapse of East Germany and precipitated its 
absorption by the Federal Republic of Germany.  „It was flight,‟ 
wrote Myron Weiner, „not an invasion, that ultimately destroyed 
the East German state‟ (Weiner, 1992-93, p. 91).  A decade later, 
during the Kosovo crisis, the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic 
used the refugee flow as a weapon of war in what was an 
unbalanced conflict with NATO.  It has been often observed that 
there is a connection between the creation of a new state and the 
phenomenon of forced migration turning a state and making into a 
„refugee-generating process‟ (Adamson, 2006, p. 172). 
International migrations influence three core areas of state power, 
namely, economic, military and diplomatic, and they all are closely 
connected to national security.  Although the host country could 
use the talent of skilled migrants, after a while it also faces the 
problem of unemployment for its own citizens and at the same 
time, creates the problem of brain drain, for example, the context in 
African countries. Some of the host countries also take advantage of 
the skills of the immigrants in the military sector. The U.S., for 
example, took immense advantage of the refuge-seeking Jews who 
were subjected to torture by Nazi Germany. It was the Jews like 
Albert Einstein and Edward Teller that made America the world‟s 
first nuclear power.  In 2004, the U.S. army recruited as many as 
40,000 noncitizens. During the Iraq war, America created a separate 
division consisting of 3,000 Iraqi expatriates and exiles known as 
the Free Iraq Forces.  India also created its „Lama Fauj‟ that was 
formedout of the Tibetan refugees.  In the field of diplomacy, the 
immigrant communities often work as lobbyists for their country of 
origin.  The lobbying done by the Armenians of Eastern European 
descent living in America contributed to the enlargement of NATO. 
1.2 The Question of Border 
International relations assume borders to be inviolable, except during 
wars.  But postmodernist scholars argue that it is their potential 
violation that proves that borders exist.  It is argued that national 
borders are „political constructs, imagined projections of territorial 
power... No matter how clearly borders are drawn on official maps, 
how many customs officials are appointed, or how many 
watchtowers are built, people will ignore borders whenever it suits 




them. In doing so, they challenge the political status quo of which 
borders are the ultimate symbol‟ (Baud & van Schendel, 1997, pp. 
211-12). Even within the nation-state framework, there can be a 
variety of outlooks held by the armed forces, bureaucrats, 
politicians, landowners, traders, and captains of industry whose 
interests may not always converge. It is possible and often 
happens, that officials stationed in border areas have different 
opinions about the management of borders than their bosses in the 
state capitals. It is not uncommon that custom officials are involved 
in smuggling or security forces are unwilling to risk their lives 
against powerful separatist groups (Baud & van Schendel, 1997, pp. 
217). 
Lately, the works by van Schendel (2002) and James Scott (2009) 
have sharpened our understanding of the intricate relationship 
between the mainland and the border regions.  They have 
questioned the limited approach of Area Studies as a sub-discipline 
of IR which ignores the hinterlands between two states.  Van 
Schendel developed the notion of Zomia (a term derived from 
Zomi to mean highlander common to several related Tibeto-
Burman languages spoken in the India-Bangladesh-Myanmar 
borders) to describe the huge mass of mainland South and 
Southeast Asia that has historically been beyond the authority of 
the nation-states, Scott by drawing from the same theory argued 
that while the people of the mainland are the people of the state, 
the people of the border are those who run away from the state.  
Yet another perspective for the same could be that colonial powers 
have created more partitions than anything else, for example 
partitions in the Indian subcontinent.  The by-products of these 
partitions are the problems of „minorities‟, „new minorities‟, „sweat 
and destitute labor‟, „gun-running‟ and „drug caravans‟, 
„immigration‟, and „alienation‟, all of which mocks the inviolability 
of the border.  Actually, the border, as Samaddar says, “exteriorises 
the interior and interiorises the exterior.”  Paradoxically, while on 
the one hand illegal migration violates the authority of the state, 
but on the other, it also upholds the same authority by allowing its 
exclusive role there (Samaddar, 1999, p. 3; Ghosh, 2016). 
  
Partha S Ghosh                                                Refugees and National Security 
47 
 
2. Case Studies of East Pakistan Refugees in India and 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan from 1979 onwards 
Having discussed above a few broad theoretical points in respect of 
refugee security connection, two case studies from the South Asian 
experience is analysed to understand the issue. The first case study 
deals with the East Pakistan refugees in India in 1971 and the 
second with Afghan refugees in Pakistan from 1979 onwards. There 
is one similarity between the two situations: both were massive in 
scale, and there is one dissimilarity: the security threat in the first 
case was to the mother state while in the second case it was to the 
host state which mostly concerned its internal security.  
2.1 Case 1: East Pakistan Refugees in India 
Above a statement by Myron Weiner has been referred in which he 
said that it was migration and not invasion that destroyed the 
German state.  One may use the same phrase to explain the 
formation of Bangladesh. The India-Pakistan war of 1971 led to the 
defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan and resulted in formation 
of Bangladesh. There was a massive refugee arrival from East 
Pakistan into bordering Indian states, specifically West Bengal. In a 
situation like this if the host country is more powerful than the 
refugee‟s mother country, and if they are in inimical terms, the 
security risk for the latter is always huge.  The presence of about 10 
million East Pakistani refugees on Indian soil not only helped India 
launch an international campaign against the military rulers of 
Pakistan but also to gather enough moral justification to use force 
to make them bend.  Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had to create 
reasonable diplomatic support in the face of general international 
indifference, if not hostility (Raghavan, 2013), by using the Bengali 
refugee issue. She emphasised that for a poor country like India it 
was impossible to cope with the situation. Even if only three rupees 
was spent per refugee in September 1971 it would have meant US $ 
576,000,000 for 8,000,000 camp refugees. By then, the foreign 
commitment was as little as $153,670,000 of which only $20,470,000 
only had actually arrived and the situation gradually worsened 
(Raghavan, 2013, pp. 206-7; Bass 2013, p. 249). During her visit to 
the United States, Indira Gandhi underlined that at the time when 
India had attained food security and things had just started to look 




good, the huge human tragedy at the India-East Pakistan border 
that was thrust upon her country, strained the national resources to 
such an extent that it would threaten the country‟s „hard-earned 
stability‟.  In the state dinner hosted by President Richard Nixon on 
4 November 1971 she did not make any effort to charm her host 
and others present there but toasted in most matter-of-factly way: 
Can you imagine the entire population of Michigan 
State suddenly converging onto New York State?  
Imagine the strain on space, on the administration, 
on services such as health and communications, on 
resources such as food and money, and this not in 
condition of affluence, but in a country already 
battling with problems of poverty and population.... 
Our administration, already strained to meet the 
rising demands of our vast population, is stretched 
to the limit in looking after nine million refugees, all 
citizens of another country.  Food stocks built 
against drought are being used up. Limited 
resources scraped together for sorely needed 
development works are being depleted (Bass, 2013, 
p. 251). 
Then, appealing to American conscience she asked: „Has not your 
own society been built of people who have fled from social and 
economic injustices?‟ (Bass 2013, p. 251). 
Although Indira Gandhi‟s U.S. sojourn did not impress the Nixon-
Kissinger duo to change their pro-Pakistan stance for they were 
more concerned about maintaining good relations with Pakistan so 
that they could use its good offices to establish contacts with Mao‟s 
China but it certainly earned public and opposition-Democratic 
sympathy, particularly that of the indomitable Democratic leader, 
Senator Edward Kennedy (Dem. MA).  His report to the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary was a harsh indictment of the U.S. 
government posture.  It said, „It is time … for Americans to 
understand what has produced this massive human tragedy and to 
recognise the bankrupt response of our government. It is time for 
Americans to understand that we must rescue the ideals of our 
foreign policy from cold calculations that have not only shaken and 
demoralised South Asia but many other parts of the world as well‟ 
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(Kennedy 1971, p. v).  The report was particularly critical of the 
U.S. policy of continued military assistance to the dictatorial regime 
of General Yahya Khan: “Nothing has come to symbolize more the 
intransigency of American policy of supporting Islamabad, than 
the shipments of military supplies.  And nothing has come to 
symbolise more the bankruptcy of this policy—carried out in the 
name of “leverage”—than the simple fact that the repression of 
East Bengal and the flow of refugees into India continues.  And war 
is closer today than ever before” (Kennedy 1971, p. 59). 
Gandhi knew the importance of public opinion in any democracy 
and more so in the United States. She, therefore, made it a point to 
spend time in New York before reaching Washington to build her 
popular support.  Huge public opinion support was built up 
against the Pakistani atrocities and in favour of the Bengali 
uprising. It was the time when America was preparing for the 
opening up of China in which the presidential adviser Henry 
Kissinger needed the logistical support of Pakistan.  Nixon-
Kissinger duo, therefore, was in no mood to listen to the voice of 
reason and human rights (details in Bass, 2013).  India was not 
unaware of these realities yet it was keeping its powder dry for the 
inevitable showdown with Pakistan.  To achieve the goal, two 
things were necessary, one, enlisting the support of the Soviets in 
case of the eventuality of an India-Pakistan war which might see 
the United States supporting Pakistan, and two, making the 
military use of the refugees to whatever extent possible.  To achieve 
the latter, India decided to give military training to some sections of 
the Bengali refugees. They were first trained as Mukti Fauj and 
later as Mukti Bahini whose cooperation during the India-Pakistan 
war proved vital for inflicting substantial damage to static 
installations and infrastructure in East-Pakistan such as bridges, 
roads, railroads, water transportation networks, power stations, 
communication systems, and ships in the Chittagong port.  The 
Mukti Bahini had the full logistical support from the Indian armed 
forces, particularly the Border Security Force (BSF) (Raghavan, 
2003, pp. 310-13; Bass 2013, pp.178-88). Indeed the Indian troops 
were on the East-Pakistan soil before Yahya Khan had declared war 
against India on 3 December 1971. In fact, India had decided to 
declare war against Pakistan the next day (Bass, 2013, p. 271). 




There was a non-military security compulsion also.  India believed 
that behind the flow of refugees was the calculated design on the 
part of Pakistan to push millions of East-Pakistani Hindus to India 
so as to neutralise the numerical advantage of East-Pakistan vis-a-
vis West-Pakistan which all the U.S. diplomats stationed in 
Pakistan had been constantly reporting (Weiner 92-93, p. 123, Bass, 
2013).  India knew that more and more Hindu refugees were 
arriving which by the end of 1971 had reached the ratio of 82:18, a 
fact that CIA and U.S. Consulate at Dhaka had reported to the 
Nixon government (Raghavan, 2013, pp. 76, 120, 206; Bass, 2013, 
pp. 154, 236-37). Knowing its domestic political fallout, the Indian 
decision-makers assiduously downplayed this fact (Bass, 2013, pp. 
121-22). If they didn‟t do it, it would have caused serious 
communal tensions, and might have even led to Hindu-Muslim 
riots. To avert such a situation, Indira Gandhi took the Jana Sangh 
leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee into confidence.  She requested him not 
to politicise the issue for otherwise it would give Pakistan a handle 
to portray the problem of refugees as a Hindu-Muslim one thereby 
defeating the Indian policy aimed at the probable return of the 
refugees to East-Pakistan (Raghavan, 2013, p. 76).  
There was yet another dimension that had much to do with the 
future planning aimed at promoting India‟s politico-strategic 
interests vis-a-vis Pakistan. Among the refugees was the Awami 
League leadership which had set up a Bangladesh Government in 
Exile in Calcutta. The Government of India and the Bangladesh 
Government in Exile coordinated their political strategies to mutual 
benefit.  India had four principal objectives in mind.  First, to see to 
it that Pakistan lost its eastern province; second, to see that the 
refugees returned to Bangladesh; third, the communists, 
particularly the pro-Chinese section, did not gain in political 
strength through the liberation movement; and fourth, the new 
nation accepted India‟s pre-eminence in the region.  Except for the 
last point, which was to be endorsed more by implication than by 
explicit declaration, all the rest were clearly endorsed by the 
Awami League.  The first objective clearly does not require any 
documentation. Regarding the second and third there were clear 
evidences that the Bangladesh Government in Exile had endorsed 
them. The fact that in Bangladesh politics, India still has many 
detractors, while Awami League stands out as its support, it has its 
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history in the events of these fateful days of Bangladesh crisis (for 
details, see Ghosh, 1989, pp. 57-64). 
The third point which had the reference to China needs some 
elaboration as it had an important internal security angle because of 
its connection with the Naxalite movement in West Bengal. In this, 
the China factor loomed largely. In the wake of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76), the Chinese not only had aided the 
separatists in some of India‟s North-Eastern states, their Chairman 
Mao Zedong had also met a group of Naxalites in December 1967. 
Mao had expressed his complete agreement with the ideological 
stance of the Naxalites and had even promised them a trade-off if 
they succeeded in their mission, namely, the acceptance of 
McMahon Line as China‟s border and requisite guerrilla training 
for the Naxal cadres in Champing Military School on the outskirts 
of Beijing (Raghavan, 2013, p. 193).  But in spite of such menacing 
possibility, Indira Gandhi tried to keep China informed about 
India‟s concern about the refugee problem and sought China‟s 
cooperation in resolving the issue.  In a letter to Zhou Enlai dated 
18 July 1971, she wrote that “I am encouraged in the belief that the 
time may be propitious to seek an exchange of views with you on a 
matter of current importance” to which Zhou never responded 
(Raghavan, 2013, p. 199). 
One of the important foreign policy expressions for modern 
democracies is the use of human rights violations in other 
countries. Either as humanitarian intervention or as Right to Protect 
(R2P) there is an increasing tendency on behalf of Western powers 
to intervene in ethnic or sectarian wars in the developing world or 
in the erstwhile Soviet provinces. NATO‟s intervention in the 
Bosnian crisis was one such example. It may be suggested that in 
this connection, India‟s Bangladesh war behind which was the 
presence of millions of East-Pakistani refugees in India, was 
probably the first such humanitarian intervention in this case by a 
developing country as a foreign policy tool.  According to the 
Indian scholar Pratap Bhanu Mehta: 
India‟s 1971 armed intervention in East Pakistan—
undertaken for a mixture of reasons—is widely and 
fairly regarded as one of the world‟s most successful 
cases of humanitarian intervention against genocide. 




Indeed, India in effect applied what we would now 
call the „responsibility to protect‟ (R2P) principle, 
and applied it well (quoted by Bass 2013, p. 334). 
2.2 Case 2: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 
Pakistan's experience vis-a-vis Afghan refugees in the post-Soviet 
invasion phase also highlights the connection between refugees 
and security.  About 3.5 million Afghan Pashtuns took shelter in 
Pakistan, mostly in the northwest Frontier Province (now Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa).  Their presence on Pakistan‟s soil was a boon for 
the dictatorial regime of Zia-ulHaq which had already ensured 
American support for its continuation in power through massive 
military and economic assistance as a frontline state in America‟s 
war in Afghanistan. The refugees were the potential mujahedeen 
(freedom fighters) who the Americans required. With their 
presence, Islamism came handy to Zia for furthering his Islamic 
cause and for perpetuating his political dominance. He effectively 
used both Islam and the traditional code of Pushtunwali to justify 
his decision of giving refuge to millions of Afghan refugees. In 
Islamic tradition, the migration of Prophet Mohammad and his 
companions from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE to avoid persecution 
known as hijrat (migration) has huge respect and as such the 
Afghan refugee influx served as a boon to Zia‟s pro-Islamic 
strategy. Since most of the Afghan refugees were Pashtuns, the 
Pashtun traditions of melmasia (hospitality) and panah (refuge) came 
into play to suit the situation well (Ghufran, 2011, p. 948). 
But gradually these refugees became a liability for the Zia regime. 
A pernicious nexus developed between the multi-million dollar 
illegal trade in narcotics and arms on the one hand and the massive 
corruption in the politico-military-bureaucratic establishment on 
the other. It not only affected Pakistan's political development, but 
dragged Pakistan into the vortex of factional ethnic conflicts with 
Afghanistan which it found difficult to extricate itself from. As the 
Afghan situation became complicated, Pakistan's federal problems 
in North West Frontier Province multiplied for it was the home of 
the same ethnic groups to which the major warring factions 
engaged in the Afghan civil war belonged.  Still, the Taliban regime 
that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 following an intense civil 
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war was pro-Pakistan, which the latter had raised from amongst 
the refugees. The Pakistan army had trained them for the job to 
Pakistan‟s advantage. It had been the strategic requirement of 
Pakistan to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan through which it 
could fulfill its need for strategic depth given its rivalry with India. 
These developments cast their shadow on India-Pakistan-Iran 
relations causing complications for South Asian regional security. 
Following 9/11 which resulted in the collapse of the Taliban regime 
once again, there was an exodus of Afghan refugees.  The U.S. led 
bombing campaign that started in October 2001 not only led 
thousands of Pashtuns to take refuge in Pakistan in a fresh wave 
but also affected the process of UNHCR-sponsored repatriation 
drive. For several ethnic and political reasons, the Pashtun, Tajik, 
Uzbek and Hazara refugees sheltered in Pakistani and Irani camps 
refused to go back. Throughout the first decade of this century, it 
was a difficult task for both the Pakistan government and the 
UNHCR to manage the Afghan refugee problem as all policies 
seemed to fail to repatriate them. Many of them went back to 
Afghanistan only to come back again as the situation there was not 
conducive for a peaceful existence and also to take advantage of the 
financial incentive provided by the UNHCR for their return 
(Ghufran, 2011 pp. 948-53).  
The Taliban militancy has now spilled over into Pakistan in the 
form of several indigenous militant outfits the most notable being 
the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).  It has posed a serious threat to 
Pakistan‟s political stability.  In the situation of U.S. withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, even if it is partial and staggering, the fear of 
India is that Afghan militancy coupled with the issue of constant 
Afghan migrations to Pakistan would not leave India unaffected.  
The challenge for India is how to handle the paradox called Af-Pak.  
The paradox is this: the United States and its allies depend 
(pending total U.S. withdrawal, this dependence would continue) 
on Pakistan for access to the „war theatre‟ and to keep the supply 
lines open. They must thus accept the political conditions set by 
Islamabad to keep the arrangement. Yet, the whole purpose of the 
war was to deny the safe haven provided to Al Qaeda by the 
Taliban regime and eradicate the forces of terrorism and 
fundamentalism from Afghanistan. If the latter continue to be 




supported and financed from Islamabad (though they also get help 
from elsewhere), the US-Pakistan arrangement itself becomes self-
defeating.  Its short-term logistical advantage is more than offset by 
a long-term bolstering of the very enemy Washington is fighting. In 
fact, there is a misalignment between Pakistan‟s interests in 
Afghanistan and those of the United States (Heine & Ghosh, 2011). 
Still, what Ayesha Jalal writes seems to be the hard reality.  She 
argues that it is not realistic for America to break off ties with 
Pakistan and lean more heavily on Indian monetary and military 
help to rebuild Afghanistan: “Most security experts on the region 
grudgingly concede that American success in Afghanistan depends 
on the Pakistani army.  Paradoxically, this army is the main obstacle as 
well as the key to peace in Afghanistan (Jalal 2014, p. 5, emphasis 
added).”  
3. Conclusion 
Among non-traditional threats to security, the problem of refugees 
is increasingly becoming one.  Because of political turmoil in 
several parts of the world, refugee flows are going beyond the 
capacity of the international system of handle.  As the phenomenon 
is closely linked to religious and ethnic militancy, human 
sentiments are coming in the way of a rational and humanitarian 
solution. In South Asia because of virtually unenforceable borders 
and the unfinished tasks of nation-building, refugee movements 
are common. Once in the host country, they keep lobbying the host 
government to take up positions hostile to the country of their 
origin which complicates bilateral relations. It may also tempt the 
host nation to settle its scores with the mother countries if they are 
in hostile terms.  Sometimes the refugees, if they are in sizable 
numbers and belong to one or more of the local ethnic groups, lead 
to internal political complications in the host state, which has 
internal security implications. Since all countries have international 
connections, these complications do not remain confined to the 
bilateral relations and assume international dimensions. In both the 
case studies, it is noticed how the role of the United States has been 
critical. There is no respite from these complexities impinging upon 
regional security however much we like to usher in. 
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